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Non-technical summary
For providing protection for intellectual property, patent law requires the com-
prehensive description of the invention, its making and using. The goal of this
disclosure requirement is to provide newly generated knowledge to the public,
and thus, to foster technological progress. Since a patent affects competition on
the market for ideas and the product market, the patenting decision incorpo-
rates a strategic decision. Economic literature commonly ignores that the extent
to which a patent actually discloses information about the invention itself is a
strategic decision of the applicant.
In this paper, a three-stage theoretical model illustrates the decision process of a
patent applicant. A follow-on invention can successfully be made by a potential
follower who bases his research on the original patent. The applicant can choose
between either a fuzzy or a distinct formulation in the patent specification whereas
he has to take into account two countervailing effects: On the one hand, a fuzzy
description decreases the usability of a patent for the followers as it increases
their research costs and at the same time their probability of success to achieve
the follow-on invention. On the other hand, fuzziness decreases the granting
probability. This model can also be linked to the quality of patent examination.
Even if the quality is high (i.e. the granting probability for a fuzzy patent is lower
than the one for a distinct patent) some cases exist for which fuzzy description is
more profitable for the inventor despite the higher risk of not receiving the grant.
These results allow careful recommendations for policymakers and patent offices.
If the goal of patent policy is an appropriate incentive system which yields clear
and precise patent descriptions in order to foster technological progress, the grant-
ing probability should be strongly reduced for fuzzy specifications. A possible way
to achieve this could be the request for a proof of concept and/or experimentation
data. This may improve the quality of examination and the quality of knowledge
disclosure via patents. Such a procedure would be analogous to the publication
procedures of scientific results, for which a precise description of data, measure-
ment and methods is required.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Ein Ziel von Patenten ist, intellektuelles Eigentum zu schu¨tzen. Fu¨r die Gewa¨hrung
des Schutzes ist es nach dem Patentgesetz erforderlich, die Erfindung und ihre
Einsatzmo¨glichkeiten umfassend zu beschreiben. Diese Offenlegung soll dazu
beitragen, neues Wissen der O¨ffentlichkeit zuga¨nglich zu machen und somit den
technologischen Fortschritt voranzutreiben. Die Anmeldung eines Patents hat
aber auch eine strategische Komponente, da ein Patent den Wettbewerb auf den
Technologie- und Produktma¨rkten beeinflusst. Allerdings wird in der Literatur
oft ignoriert, dass bereits die Formulierung einer Patentanmeldung eine strate-
gische Entscheidung ist.
In diesem Papier wird mit Hilfe eines dreistufigen theoretischen Modells der
Entscheidungsprozess eines Patentanmelders analysiert. Eine nachfolgende Erfind-
ung kann auch erfolgreich von einem Dritten geta¨tigt werden, dessen Forschung
auf dem urspru¨nglichen Patent aufsetzt. Der Anmelder entscheidet, ob er das
Patent pra¨zise oder ungenau spezifiziert. Hierbei muss er zwei gegenla¨ufige Ef-
fekte gegeneinander abwa¨gen: Einerseits senkt eine unpra¨zise Formulierung die
Nutzbarkeit des Patents fu¨r Dritte, indem es deren Forschungskosten erho¨ht
und gleichzeitig ihre Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit fu¨r die nachfolgende Entdeckung
senkt. Andererseits senken Ungenauigkeiten die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Paten-
terteilung. Das Modell kann auch im Hinblick auf die Qualita¨t der Patentpru¨-
fung im Erteilungsverfahren interpretiert werden. Selbst wenn die Qualita¨t der
Patentpru¨fung hoch ist (d.h. die Ablehnungswahrscheinlichkeit fu¨r eine unpra¨zise
formulierte Patentanmeldung ist ho¨her als fu¨r eine pra¨zise formulierte), gibt es
Fa¨lle, in denen Ungenauigkeiten in der Formulierung fu¨r den Anmelder profitabel
sind trotz der niedrigeren Erteilungswahrscheinlichkeit.
Die Politikempfehlung, die sich aus den Ergebnissen des Modells ergibt, ist, dass
die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Erteilung eines Patents im Falle einer nicht ausreichend
pra¨zisierten Beschreibung stark reduziert werden muss, um den technologischen
Fortschritt zu fo¨rdern. Um dies zu erreichen, ko¨nnte die Patenterteilung an die
Bedingung der Verfu¨gbarkeit von (funktionierenden) Prototypen oder Daten von
Versuchsdurchfu¨hrungen gekoppelt werden. Dies wu¨rde sowohl die Qualita¨t der
Patentpru¨fung als auch die Qualita¨t der Offenlegung durch Patente verbessern.
Dieses Vorgehen wa¨re analog zum Publikationsprozess von wissenschaftlichen
Ergebnissen, in dem eine genaue Beschreibung der verwendeten Daten, Mess-
und Analyseverfahren verlangt wird.
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1 Introduction
The primary motivation of governments for issuing patents is to provide incentives
to innovate. Within the innovation process new knowledge is generated which
bears some characteristics of a public good. Due to this, the new discovery may
be subject to the expropriation of knowledge. A patent is, hence, a tool to transfer
new, freely accessible knowledge into a proprietary good. As a consequence, the
discovery is protected from expropriation and can be traded like a commodity,
i.e. the inventor has the possibility to generate returns from his R&D activities
by either exclusively manufacturing the innovation, by licensing-out, or by selling
the intellectual property (IP). Besides this protective effect of patenting, patents
are supposed to contribute to a society’s knowledge stock through the mandatory
disclosure of the invention.1 The disclosure requirement in the U.S. is rooted in
35 U.S.C. §112 which states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the inven-
tion, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly con-
nected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.
To be precise, we understand a “patent specification” as including the claims as
well as the description of an invention. Necessarily, this relates our approach
to the broad literature concerning patent breadth. Our understanding of the
impact of fuzziness on patent breadth is that fuzziness blurs a patent’s boundaries
(see Bessen and Meurer 2009) but does not necessarily broaden them. However,
the chance that a fuzzy patent is interpreted wider than a distinct patent by
competitors or legal institutions, e.g. courts, may increase with the degree of
its impreciseness. At the same time, the indistinct patent specification may lead
to the revocation of the patent when it is challenged in court (see Lemley et al.
(2005)).
The strategic dimension of patenting is widely acknowledged (see e.g. Hall and
Harhoff 2012). We argument that – unraveling the procedure of applying for
the patent – the manner in which a patent specification is written itself already
constitutes a strategic decision: choosing a fuzzy description of the invention may
delay or even hinder the market entry of competitors but has the drawback of
decreasing the probability of patent grant. The strategic decision how to write a
1Whether the disclosed information can be used by competitors without licensing depends
inter alia on the patent law’s definition of the research use exemption.
patent specification thus depends on the threat of entry by competitors and the
probability of receiving a patent grant which both decrease when using a more
fuzzy description.2
Our paper contributes to the literature on the value of patent disclosure (see
e.g. Devlin 2010, Gambardella et al. 2011). The disclosure effect of patenting
is intended to foster technological progress. However, legal and economic schol-
ars claim that patent disclosure is only limited. The literature has identified
three major reasons for this: First, the technical information contained in patent
descriptions is rather scarce. This is mainly attributed to the fact that patent
documents are written in a specific, legal language veiling the technical aspects of
the discovery (Seymore 2010). Second, as patent disclosure may benefit a paten-
tee’s competitors – this is the main explanation why inventors are reluctant to
patent their discoveries (see e.g., Cohen et al. 2002 for empirical evidence) – the
incentive to patent is highly influenced by the nature of the technology incorpo-
rated in an invention: if it is easy to re-engineer, patenting may become more
attractive for inventors. Hence, some scholars suspect that applicants omit essen-
tial know-how and only disclose that part of the invention which can most easily
be re-engineered (Hall and Harhoff 2012). And finally, firms seem to formulate
abstract claims in order to expand patent protection to related future inventions.
The main difficulty is that abstract claims blur the boundaries of the property
right (Bessen and Meurer 2009, Roin 2007). In our paper, the term fuzzy patent
includes any of these strategic concealments in patent specifications: the use of
a specific “patent language”, the patenting of parts of the discovery and abstract
claims.
The presented theoretical model analyzes an inventor’s decision of how to phrase
his patent specification.3 A successful inventor faces the tradeoff between a clearly
written patent specification with a high granting probability which yields high
technology disclosure to competitors, and an imprecise patent description with
a low granting probability which mitigates technology disclosure as competitors
need additional time to “decode” the fuzzy patent in order to imitate or invent
around it.
Specifically, we model a three-stage game along the granting process for patent
applications looking at two firms: the innovator who has achieved an invention
which he wants to protect with a patent and a (potential) follower who may decide
on whether to invest in R&D to imitate or invent around the patent. In the first
stage the innovator decides how precisely to phrase the patent when filing the
application. On the second stage, the follower decides whether he would invest in
R&D to enter the market with a copy or a variant of the product. On the third
stage, after the patent office decided whether to grant the patent, firms realize
2Hall and Harhoff 2012 provide a similar argument.
3The presented model is inspired by the model presented in Bessen 2005 that focuses on the
functioning of patents as a means of technology diffusion.
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payoffs according to their respective commercialization strategies.
Our work relates to different approaches within the patent literature. In their
seminal paper, Lemley et al. 2005 describe the notion of patents as probabilis-
tic rights that – due to low examination quality – may be found invalid when
challenged in court. The presented model takes one step back and proposes that
inventors anticipate low examination quality. By obscuring their patent descrip-
tions they try to undermine the intended technology disclosure. We show that in
a setting with low examination quality, i.e. the probability that a “fuzzy” patent
is granted is nearly as high as the probability that a “distinct” patent is granted,
inventors indeed have an incentive to obscure their patent specification.
Our model has a practical bearing. In the case Teva Canada Ltd. v. Pfizer Canada
Inc., 2012 SCC 60, the court deemed Pfizer’s patent on erectile dysfunction invalid
because Pfizer did not indicate which of the two compounds protected by the
patent claims was the effective one. Hence, the court agreed that Teva, the
prospective producer of a generic medicament, was not provided with a full and
concise description of Pfizer’s invention and would have needed to conduct further
experimentation to re-engineer it. This example shows that even granted patents
run the risk of being deemed invalid. In this paper, we focus on the preceding
decision of the inventor on how to phrase the patent application. As we aim at
understanding the very basic mechanisms that drive the incentives to obscure
a patent specification, we ignore the (probably higher) risk of litigation which
accompanies a fuzzy patent and leave this issue to future research.
For further anecdotal evidence, we refer to an interview with a R&D service
firm in the area of synthetics.4 The R&D service firm was mandated to develop
a new synthetic with specific characteristics by one of the big players in the
market for synthetics. As a result, they identified an exact temperature to which
the composition has to be heated to reach the favorable characteristics. The
interviewee’s answer concerning the optimal patenting strategy5 was that – as
it is mandatory for patents covering chemical compounds to disclose the exact
composition of the components – the best way to protect this invention would
be to seek protection for a wide range of possible temperatures within which one
would still get similar synthetics but with less favorable characteristics.
From the related empirical survey6 of 135 small and medium sized enterprises
in Germany, we are able to extract a further hint that patent specifications do
not necessarily contain enabling knowledge, suggesting that patentees are able
to obscure their inventions. In an online survey, innovative firms, which filed a
4This interview was conducted in the context of a project within the SEEK framework. The
topic of this research project is “The Research Use Exemption from Patent Infringement:
Boon or Bane?”. See seek.zew.de.
5As a matter of fact, the R&D service firm usually does not apply for patent protection as
they are mandated to develop new products the proprietary assignation of which is part of
the contract concluded with its customer.
6See footnote 4.
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patent to protect their invention, were asked to think of an expert skilled in the
art who has a perfectly equipped lab; how easy would it be for this expert to
re-engineer the patented innovation using the technological information disclosed
in the patent specification.
Table 1: Patent Disclosure (Share of firms)
extremely easy 2 3 4 5 6 extremely difficult
0.118 0.212 0.153 0.200 0.141 0.118 0.059
Source: SEEK survey on research use exemption.
As the above table shows the answers were scattered over a 7-point Likert scale
provided to assess the statement, ranging from “extremely easy” to “extremely
difficult”. These results reveal that firms subjectively assess their patent spec-
ification as not so clearly written that another person could easily rebuild the
protected invention which provides anecdotal evidence for our argumentation
that firms strategically obscure their patent specifications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our theo-
retical model. The three stage game is solved by backward induction, beginning
with the analysis of the commercialization payoffs in section 2.1, the research
investment decision of the non-patentee firm in section 2.2 and the decision be-
tween a fuzzy or a distinct patent specification in section 2.3. Section 3 concludes.
Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Suppose risk-neutral firms, of which one, the “innovator” (called the “leader”
throughout the rest of the paper), owns an invention which he decided to protect
by a patent. His rivals, the “followers”, will attempt to enter the market for the
innovative product by investing in research to imitate or invent around the (ap-
plied for) patent whenever this is feasible for them. In order to enter, followers
face research costs which are subject to the phrasing of the leader’s patent. For
simplicity, we assume that these costs are such that only one rival firm is poten-
tially able to enter.7 Both firms interact in a simple three-stage game where the
decisions are intertwined with the timing of the patenting process. A simplified
timeline of the patenting procedure is depicted in Figure 1.
7Allowing more than one rival firm entering the market would complicate the model while
leaving the overall qualitative results unchanged.
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time
18 months 2 - 3 years
application publication grant decision
Figure 1: Timing of the patenting process
A patent application process may take several years whereas every patent appli-
cation is published after 18 months, independently of the progress of the patent
examination procedure. Only during the period of the first 18 months the ap-
plication is kept secret. The time between application and grant decision is on
average almost three years for the USPTO (see ?) and more than 4 years for the
European Patent Office (see ?).
The decisions of the firms are depicted in Figure 2. First, the leader decides on
the phrasing of his patent specification. He can either clearly define the patented
matter in the patent specification, i.e. choose a distinct patent, or he may obscure
his innovative knowledge in the patent specification, i.e. formulate a fuzzy patent.
With the publication of the patent, the follower observes the usefulness of the
patent for him and then decides whether to invest in imitating/inventing around
the patent or not. His research project is successful with probability qs, s = f, d
whereas it costs cs, s = f, d in any case, success or failure. We assume that
the probability of success is higher, if a distinct patent provides easily accessible
know how, meaning that qd > qf . We further assume that the necessary research
investment is lower with a distinct than with a fuzzy patent, cd < cf .
Subject to the phrasing of the patent application, the patent office then decides
whether the patent is granted or not.8 A distinct patent application is granted
with probability pd while a fuzzy specification is granted with a lower probability,
pf . After the granting decision, both firms simultaneously realize their respective
market entry strategy regarding the innovation. While the follower’s market
entry depends on his successful inventing around/imitation of the invention, the
leader could enter in any case, irrespective of the patent office’s decision. Note
that market entry does not necessarily mean that the leader commercializes his
innovation on the product market, it could also be that he decides to license his
patent without marketing it himself. In any case, he chooses the strategy which
yields positive payoffs.
8In reality this grant decision is the final decision in an interaction process between patent
authorities and the applicant, during which the phrasing of the patent specification may be
modified. For simplicity, we only consider the phrasing of the patent application as decisive
for the patent office’s granting decision. We are aware of the fact that the patent office
requires the fulfillment of the criteria of newness and a sufficient inventive step.
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Figure 2: The order of decisions
Regarding the phrasing of his patent, the leader faces the trade-off between a
positive and a negative effect of a fuzzy patent specification. On the one hand,
fuzziness yields two benefits for the leader: (i) it increases research costs for
the follower from cd to cf and (ii) it decreases the probability that the follower
successfully invents around the patent from qd to qf , i.e. fuzziness mitigates the
threat of market entry. This is due to the fact that the innovative knowledge
contained in the patent specification can be straightforwardly implemented by a
rival firm if the phrasing of the patent is distinct. With a fuzzy patent, inventing
around is more costly and failure of inventing around or imitating is more likely as
a follower firstly needs to concretize the unspecific description of the innovation.
On the other hand, obscuring the patent specification bears a higher risk of a
rejection of the patent application: in the case of a fuzzy patent specification, a
patent will only be granted with a lower probability pf < pd.
We solve the game by backward induction. On the final stage, payoffs are realized.
On the second stage, the follower after observing the publication of the patent
application decides on his research investment. On stage 1, the leader decides
about the specificity used in the formulation of his patent.
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2.1 Realization of payoffs
In Figure 2, the alternative revenues of the leader and the follower are given by
LBa and F
B
a where the lower index a = i, u states whether the follower success-
fully imitated/invented around (i), whether he was unsuccessful (u) or whether
he refrained from investing in the first place (n). The upper index B = G,R
represents the cases that the patent is granted (G) or rejected (R). Note that
only for the leader these revenues correspond to the profits. To calculate the
actual profits for the follower in the case that he invests in research, costs cs,
s = d, f have to be subtracted from the revenue. While the cases (1) inventing
around and (2) imitation are not explicitly considered as alternative strategies in
our model, they are nevertheless both included subject to a proper interpretation
of the payoffs. In case (1), the follower enters the market with a variant of the
innovation that does not infringe the issued patent, such that the follower does
not have to pay licensing royalties to the leader.9 To realize positive payoffs, in
this case the leader also enters the product market. Thus, in the case of suc-
cessful imitation/inventing around the payoffs LGi and F
G
i − cs with s = d, f are
the profits realized in a duopoly with differentiated products (these scenarios are
represented by rectangles 1 and 6, counting from the lower left corner, in Figure
2). In case (2), the follower has to pay licensing royalties to the leader. Then the
patentee does not need to enter the product market to collect positive payoffs, LGi
would be the licensing royalties he earns. A different strategy for the leader could
also be to commercialize the innovation himself and collect licensing royalties at
the same time. His payoff LGi then would consist of the profits in a differentiated
duopoly plus licensing royalties whereas the follower’s payoff FGi −cs with s = d, f
consists of the duopoly profits minus licensing fees.
Staying in rectangles 1 and 6, we next discuss the situation where the patent is
not granted. Here we implement the strong assumption that the leader realizes
zero profits whenever the patent is rejected, i.e. LRi = 0, L
R
u = 0 and L
R
n =
0. Note that this does not mean that the leader will never realize profits from
his innovation. We simply assume that he will not realize them in the time
period which we consider, which ends directly after the granting decision. As
mentioned, the patenting process de facto is an interaction process so that it is
quite improbable that a patent applicant is completely surprised to find his patent
rejected. More probably, he will already have developed a strategy to cope with
this situation. This could, for example, be a new patent application with modified
claims or the division of the innovation into more than one patent application. In
any case, we assume that he postpones commercializing the innovation. At the
same time, the follower who successfully invented around or imitated will enter
and collect positive profits FRi − cs with s = d, f . Finally, in the case of a patent
grant when the follower is either unsuccessful or chooses not to enter in the first
9The fact that the follower used the patent as knowledge input for his research is exempted
from patent protection by the research use exemption.
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place (rectangles 2 to 5 in Figure 2), the patentee enters the market and earns
positive profits LGu and L
G
n respectively.
2.2 The follower’s decision
On the second stage, the follower decides whether to invent around/imitate the
patent or not. We obtain his decision given either a fuzzy or a distinct patent
by simply comparing his expected payoffs in both cases. Given a fuzzy patent
specification his expected profit if he chooses to invest in research to invent
around/imitate is given by
qs
[
ps(F
G
i − cs) + (1− ps)(FRi − cs)
]
+ (1− qs)(−cs) with s = f, d, (1)
whereas his expected profit given the alternative of no investment is null. Thus,
the follower will invest in research whenever his expected profit is positive. Solving
this condition for the probability of a patent grant yields the critical condition
pFs ≡
FRi − cs/qs
FRi − FGi
> ps with s = f, d. (2)
To obtain economically reasonable results we assume cs/F
R
i < qs < cs/F
G
i , s =
d, f . Whenever the granting probability is lower than this critical threshold it is
profitable for the follower to invest in inventing around/imitating the potential
patent. The two critical conditions for s = f, d constitute four alternative possible
cases subject to the parameter values of pf and pd. These cases are depicted
in Figure 3. Note that the angle bisector defines the area where the granting
probabilities pd and pf are equal. Therefore, all parameter values in the area below
the angle bisector can be interpreted as reflecting a high examination quality as
here the granting probability is higher with a distinct patent, pd > pf , while the
area above the angle bisector reflects a low examination quality as here pf > pd
holds.
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11
pf
pd
pFf
pFd
I II
III IV
I : invest in both cases
II : invest only with fuzzy patent
III : invest only with distinct patent
IV : no investment
Figure 3: The follower’s decision to invest
In area I, ps < p
F
s , s = f, d, holds so that the follower invests in both cases,
fuzzy or distinct patent. In area II, only pf < p
F
f holds while pd > p
F
d meaning
that investing in research is only profitable with a fuzzy patent. In area III, the
situation is reversed, here pd < p
F
d holds while pf > p
F
f . Therefore, the follower
only chooses to invest when the leader uses a distinct language in his patent spec-
ification. In area IV , both conditions are violated so that it is never profitable
for the follower to invest.
2.3 The leader’s decision
Given these possible scenarios, the leader decides how to phrase his patent on the
first stage of the game (see Figure 4). If the exogenous parameters pd and pf are
such that case I results, the comparison of the expected profit with a fuzzy or a
distinct patent specification gives us the condition
qfpfL
G
i + (1− qf )pfLGu > qdpdLGi + (1− qf)pfLGu
for the advantageousness of a fuzzy patent. Solving this condition for pf yields
the critical threshold
pf > p
I
f ≡ pd
LGu − qd(LGu − LGi )
LGu − qf (LGu − LGi )
. (3)
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For all granting probabilities above this threshold a fuzzy patent is profitable for
the leader. As the curve describing pIf is linear in pd and we have p
I
f
∣∣
(qd=1)
< 1,
it lies below the angle bisector and we can state
Lemma 1 In case I, the leader has the incentive to choose a fuzzy patent spec-
ification as long as the resulting decrease of the granting probability is not too
high.
Note that in case I the follower enters even with a fuzzy patent. Obscuring
the patent is nevertheless profitable for the leader as it increases his expected
profit by decreasing the follower’s probability of success. Figure 4 shows how the
critical threshold divides area I into the sub-areas Ia and Ib. If ceteris paribus
the effect of a fuzzy patent specification on the usability of information for the
follower increases (the probability of successful research, qf , decreases) the critical
threshold pIf decreases. This would be reflected by a downward movement of the
bold black curve in area I of Figure 4, such that the striped area Ia grows larger:
fuzzy patents become profitable for a larger range of parameter values. If ceteris
paribus the granting probability for a distinct patent, pd, increases, the critical
threshold increases moving the curve in Figure 4 upward, such that the striped
area Ia decreases: the use of fuzzy patents becomes less profitable.
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Figure 4: The leader’s decision between a fuzzy or a distinct patent
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In case II, the follower only invests given a fuzzy patent. The critical condition
for the profitability of a fuzzy patent changes to
qfpfL
G
i + (1− qf)pfLGu > pdLGu .
Solving this condition for pf it is straightforward that it can never be fulfilled due
to the fact that case II only occurs if examination quality is high, i.e. pd > pf .
Thus we have
Lemma 2 In case II, the leader always chooses a distinct patent specification.
In case III, the follower only invests if the patent specification is distinct, that
is, whenever the leader chooses a fuzzy patent, the follower will refrain from
investing in research. This adds an additional strategic component to the choice
of the patent language: by obscuring his patent the leader can possibly inhibit an
imitation attempt of the follower. The critical condition comparing the expected
profits with a fuzzy and a distinct patent yields
pf > p
III
f ≡ pd
LGu − qd(LGu − LGi )
LGu
. (4)
If the probability that the follower’s investment is successful, qd, is high enough,
this threshold divides area III into two sub-areas, see Figure 4. In area IIIa, it
is profitable for the leader to obscure his patent, as then the follower refrains from
investing in imitation. If however the difference between the granting probabilities
is high, such that a distinct patent yields a sufficiently greater probability that the
patent will be granted, the strategic aspect of discarding the follower’s research
investment is undermined by the risk of rejection: In area IIIb, the leader chooses
a distinct patent language and thus accommodates the research investment of his
rival who will invest due to the fact that inventing around/imitating successfully
has a high probability. Whenever qd is too low, area IIIb vanishes and choosing
a fuzzy patent is always profitable as then the follower refrains from investing.
Summarizing we state
Lemma 3 In case III, a fuzzy patent specification can discard the follower’s
research attempts. Given a high success probability of the follower, qd, the leader
has the incentive to choose a fuzzy patent specification as long as the resulting
decrease of the granting probability is not too high. Given a low success probability,
the leader always chooses a fuzzy patent specification.
Finally, in area IV where the follower never invests it is obviously profitable for
the leader to choose a distinct patent specification for high examination quality,
qd > qf and fuzzy patent language for low examination quality qd < qf . This
gives us
Lemma 4 In case IV the leader chooses a distinct patent specification given
qd > qf and a fuzzy patent specification given qd < qf .
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The leader has a strong incentive to strategically use fuzziness in his patent
specification whenever the probability that the patent will nevertheless be granted
is high. Then, by obscuring the description of the invention the leader has a
weapon against the possible market entry of a rival. He can mitigate the threat
of entry by imposing an additional hurdle for the follower: the fuzziness of the
patent specification.
The driving force between the leader’s decision is the quality of patent examina-
tion which – within the scope of this simple model – can be interpreted as the
difference between the granting probabilities with a distinct and a fuzzy patent
specification, Δp ≡ pd − pf . Facing the decision how to formulate his patent an
inventor knows (or at least has a belief) about the examination quality of the
patent authorities. In our model setting, he knows on which point in Figure 4 he
is “located”. Recall that examination quality is highest in the lower right corner
and decreases moving to the upper left corner. For a low examination quality, we
naturally find that a fuzzy patent specification is always beneficial, but interest-
ingly for a high examination quality (below the angle bisector) it is not necessarily
optimal to choose a distinct patent language. Whenever the difference between
granting probabilities is not too high, a fuzzy patent yields higher expected profits
for the inventor. The following proposition summarizes this central finding.
Proposition 1 A successful inventor has the incentive to obscure his patent spec-
ification whenever this does not substantially decrease the probability of a patent
grant, i.e. whenever patent examination quality is not too high.
Figure 4 depicts this finding graphically. It is straightforward10 that the threshold
pIIIf derived earlier lies below p
I
f . The additional strategic component of a fuzzy
patent is displayed by the “jump” between the bold lines representing the differ-
ence between the critical thresholds pIf and p
III
f . This jump draws from the strong
impact of the use of a fuzzy patent language on the strategy of the follower in case
III: His non-investment given a fuzzy patent substantially increases the leader’s
expected payoff, making the use of an imprecise patent language profitable for a
larger range of parameter values. This finding gives us
Proposition 2 If the granting probability is high despite an imprecise patent
language, pf > p
F
f , a fuzzy patent can even prevent imitation/inventing around
the patent and thereby mitigates the threat of market entry by a rival firm.
Recall that examination quality Δp = pd−pf becomes larger when moving to the
lower right corner. Therefore, the striped region in area III covers a wider range
of examination qualities than the striped region in area I, reflecting the additional
strategic component of a fuzzy patent in case III. Due to this a fuzzy patent
specification is beneficial even if patent examination quality is relatively high, i.e.
in such a case even a (small) increase in the quality of patent examination cannot
reduce the strategic use of a fuzzy patent language.
10As obviously pIIIf
∣∣
(pd=1)
< pIf
∣∣
(pd=1)
.
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3 Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical model which explains how the degree of speci-
ficity of a patent description may be used strategically to limit possible positive
effects of patent publication on the research of a rival firm. Earlier studies al-
ready hinted to the fact that the patent language might be a harmful factor to
disclosure (see Fromer 2009, Seymore 2010, Hall and Harhoff 2012).
We consider the effect of a patentee’s decision on how to phrase his patent de-
scription using either a distinct or fuzzy patent language. Obscuring the patent
specification to limit the technical specificity, on the one hand, decreases the
usability of the patent for a follower, which is reflected by an increase of the
follower’s research costs and by a decrease of his probability of success. On the
other hand, a fuzzy patent decreases the probability to get the patent granted.
Concluding we find that the obscurement of the patent description may be prof-
itable for an innovator in some cases. We find that for low examination quality it
is always beneficial for an inventor to choose a fuzzy patent formulation. For high
examination quality, we identify two scenarios in which the fuzzy formulation of
a patent yields higher profits than the use of a distinct patent description: (i)
If the granting probability despite the use of a fuzzy language is not too high,
the follower will invest in inventing around (or imitating) the (applied for) patent
despite its impreciseness. The leader nevertheless chooses a fuzzy patent as his
expected profit is higher due to the decrease of the follower’s probability of suc-
cess. (ii) If the granting probability in case of a fuzzy patent lies above a critical
threshold, the competitor does not invest in inventing around or imitating the
patent. In this case, a fuzzy patent imposes an effective entry hurdle for the
follower.
If we take the common assumption – that a higher level of aggregate R&D invest-
ment results in a faster technological progress – authorities would prefer distinct
descriptions (in the presented model with a distinct patent the follower invests in
research in three out of four considered cases, while with a fuzzy patent he invests
in two out of the four cases). As Seymore 2010 points out a patent application
does usually not need to be amended by the proof of a working embodiment or
experimentation results. In this respect, our results would suggest that a manda-
tory requirement of providing such data and information at the time of the patent
application may enhance the examination quality and the quality of disclosure.
This procedure would be analogous to scientific publications where exact data,
measurements etc. must be submitted in order to get published.11
11As a side note to the specificity of pharmaceutical patents: Providing reliable information
on the working of the invention would not mean that filing needs to be postponed until the
end of the clinical trials. The proof of a working discovery is in the first place not linked
neither to its effectiveness nor to its harmlessness with respect to the patients.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
The function running through the point (pFf , p
F
d ) in Figure 4 is given by pdp
F
d . For
area IIIb to exist the critical value pIIIf needs to lie above this function. Solving
pIIIf > pdp
F
d for qd we obtain the two solutions
q±d ≡
2cd
√
LGu
FGi
√
LGu ±
√
4cd(F
G
i − FRi )(LGi − LGu ) + FGi 2LGu
.
From twice differentiating pIIIf −pdpFd with respect to qd we know that in between
these zero points of the curve lies a minimum. Due to its negative denominator,
q−d is negative, whereas we have 0 < q
+
d < 1. Thus we can state that for qd > q
+
d
the critical condition pIIIf > pdp
F
d is fulfilled and hence area IIIb exists.
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